As a prelude to articles published in this special issue, I briefly sketch changing historiographical conventions regarding the 'occult' in recent history of science and medicine scholarship. Next, a review of standard claims regarding psychical research and parapsychology in philosophical discussions of the demarcation problem reveals that these have tended to disregard basic primary sources and instead rely heavily on problematic popular accounts, simplistic notions of scientific practice, and outdated teleological historiographies of progress. I conclude by suggesting that rigorous and sensitively contextualized case studies of past elite heterodox scientists may be potentially useful to enrich historical and philosophical scholarship by highlighting epistemologies that have fallen through the crude meshes of triumphalist and postmodernist historiographical generalizations alike.
6 I'm using the American and capitalised spelling 'Skeptics' to distinguish representatives of the ideological US-based movement from 'sceptic' as it is commonly understood in philosophical and scientific discourse, i.e. as one suspending judgement on the basis of systematically informed doubt. Closely linked to Skeptics organizations have been the creation of chairs for the 'Public Understanding of Science' at Oxford, and the recent Professorship in the 'Public Understanding of Psychology' at Hertfordshire University. For sociological studies of 'organized Skepticism' see, e.g., Pinch & Collins (1984) and Hess (1993) . 7 The term 'psychical research' is traditionally associated with the investigation of alleged psychic phenomena using a variety of methods, while 'parapsychology' typically denotes their lab-based quantitative study as promoted in the 1930s by the American biologist J. B. Rhine at Duke University and later generations of researchers. For the coinage of the term 'Parapsychologie' in late-1880s Germany in the context of the professionalization of psychology see Sommer (2013b) . On the academic reception of Rhine's parapsychology see the seminal study by Mauskopf & McVaugh (1980) .been a wealth of scholarly monographs, overviews, bibliographical reference works and textbooks of parapsychological research (see, for example, Driesch, 1933; Greenwood, Pratt, Rhine, Smith, & Stuart, 1940; White & Dale, 1973; White, 1976 White, , 1990 Wolman, 1977; Edge, Morris, Palmer, & Rush, 1986; Irwin & Watt, 2007) .
Whereas the most sophisticated and therefore scientifically relevant part of this literature is typically excluded from popular and educational writings on science and the 'paranormal', historical accounts routinely exclude or belittle preoccupations of many well-known scientists with controversial questions. For instance, it is not widely known that psychologists like William
McDougall, Gardner Murphy and Hans Eysenck openly advocated psychical research (e.g. Sommer, 2013a, Introduction) ; Hans Berger's development of the electroencephalogram (EEG) was driven by what he believed was a dramatic 'crisis telepathy' experience involving his sister (Kramer, 2013; Millett, 2001) ; Kurt Gödel became convinced of the reality of telepathy after conducting experiments with his wife (Dawson, 1997, pp. 29-30) ; Wolfgang Pauli saw a link between quantum mechanics and 'poltergeist'-style mind-matter interactions he was said to have experienced (Enz, 2002; Meier, 2001) ; Albert Einstein expressed his conviction that telepathy "deserves the most earnest consideration, not only of the laity, but also of the psychologists by profession" (Einstein, 1962, p. ix) , and even two members of the Vienna Circle, Hans Hahn (a vice president of the Austrian SPR) and Rudolf Carnap, were keenly interested in psychical research (much to the chagrin of Wittgenstein -see Carnap, 1963, p. 26; Neurath & Cohen, 1973, p. 43) . As contributions to this special issue confirm, these examples are no mere anachronisms or eccentricities, but demonstrate that serious interest in so-called psychic phenomena has endured in sometimes eminent members of scientific communities.
Psychical research and the demarcation problem
While late-nineteenth and twentieth century empirical interest in the 'miraculous', far from constituting a cultural anomaly in need of historical explanation, can be understood in terms of continuity, popular standard historiographies not only persist as the backbone for writings on the public understanding of science but have also informed professional discussions of the demarcation problem in philosophy. Though the following review is not intended as a prescriptive contribution to the philosophy of science, it will argue that here as elsewhere one can formulate a pessimistic induction: those expressing the strongest misgivings about unorthodox disciplines are typically those who made the least effort of familiarizing themselves with basic primary sources.
Perhaps the most frequent standard claim regarding psychical research is an alleged renitent metaphysical bias that has been thought to be its organizing principle and caused the typical lack of rigour that is supposed to have characterized this work. Mario Bunge, for example, began his analysis of parapsychology by stating that it was "the modern name for spiritualism, mediumnism, cartomancy, and other archaic beliefs and practices" (Bunge, 1967, p. 43) . 9 In a later article, Bunge further complained that parapsychological researchers were "more attracted to the supernatural than to the material, and to the arcane than to what can be explained. No wonder, for they are spiritualists not materialists" (Bunge, 1991, p. 135) . Similarly, for Paul Churchland (1998) the history of parapsychology reduces to that of a collective attempt of finding "some unpatchable hole in materialism" (p. 319), and in his contribution to an Aristotelian Society symposium on psychical research, philosopher Robert Robinson maintained the discipline's history "has told us nothing about man's nature except that he likes mysteries and likes to believe in spirits and wants to go on living" (Robinson, 1950, p. 205) .
Historians (as well as many present-day scientists) will find Bunge's insistence on a materialistic world-view as a necessary condition of scientificity odd not least since this criterion would remove large sectors of iconic figures ranging from Bacon to Planck from the scientific halls of fame. Moreover, relevant primary sources quickly reveal that elite psychical researchers were driven by a variety of concerns and held often conflicting epistemological presuppositions, ranging from desires to establish evidence-based foundations for undogmatic and humanistic forms of spirituality to positivist-inductivist approaches indifferent and even utterly unsympathetic to religious questions (Sommer, 2013a, chapter 2) . Not only the Vienna Circle example enormously complicates assertions of metaphysical bias. The doyen of French psychical research, Nobel laureate Charles Richet, for instance, categorically rejected the 'spirit hypothesis' to account for mediumistic phenomena, and being a materialist perhaps as absolute as Bunge and Churchland, he was confident that sooner or later explanations compatible with his materialist convictions would come forth for telepathy, clairvoyance and other controversial phenomena of whose existence he became fully convinced (cf. Richet, 1923 Richet, , 1924 Teresa Brancaccio's essay in this volume) had absolutely no interests in promoting religious tenets through their investigations of mediums either, and like Richet they were decidedly hostile to the 'spirit hypothesis'. There was never a time when the community of parapsychological researchers was dominated by spiritualist or metaphysical dogma, and some prominent parapsychologists 9 Philosopher Nicholas Maxwell likewise thought that parapsychology belonged to the "the most bizarre and absurd of pseudoscientific, quasi-religious disciplines one cares to think of" (Maxwell, 1974, p. 249). continue to hold squarely epiphenomalist and materialist positions today. shows that popular claims of the refutation of certain unorthodox traditions and beliefs having occurred through 'science' (i.e. by careful and dispassionate empirical testing) need to be soundly qualified.
Another standard objection to psychical research is that its supposed effects are notoriously capricious and unreplicable. Mario Bunge, for whom the history of parapsychology merely boils down to a continued "conspiracy" of scientific dilettantes (Bunge, 1967, p. 45) , observed that psychic phenomena "are not repeatable, at least in the presence of unbelievers" (p. 44). Similarly, Antony Flew agreed that "If scientific-minded people view the evidence of psychical research with suspicion because it is not repeatable, then they are quite right. The whole object of the scientific exercise is to discover true laws, and theories that explain the truth of these laws (Flew, 1978, p. 268) . As Richard Noakes' contribution to this volume strikingly shows, however, it is not only since Michael Polanyi (1962) discussed essentially tacit factors in the measurement and replication of effects even in conventional science that simplistic concepts of experimental replicability have been 10 For example, the current president of the SPR, psychologist Richard Broughton, and the lead investigator of the famous CIA 'Stargate' project, physicist Edwin May (a disciple of Daniel Dennett), are among those categorically rejecting any transcendental, religious or spiritual implications of parapsychology. For a survey of epistemological positions within the community of parapsychological researchers, see Blackmore (1989) . On the question of epistemic pluralism in parapsychology see also Hövelmann (1987) . 11 Some decades later, psychologists ruthlessly guarding the territories of their nascent profession routinely emphasised the supposed dangers of unrestrictedly empirical approaches to spiritualism and telepathy for enlightened Christianity (Sommer, 2013a, chapters 1 & 4) .
Moreover, though a consultation of some of the primary literature cited above will quickly reveal a lack of consensus which if any of the psychic phenomena have been established beyond doubt within the parapsychological community, 13 even unsympathetic external observers have occasionally expressed the opinion that the replication rate in parapsychology was remarkable and the evidence therefore conclusive. Alan Turing, for example, commented on the accumulated experimental data: "How we should like to discredit them! Unfortunately the statistical evidence, at least for telepathy, is overwhelming" (Turing, 1950, p. 453) . Likewise, mathematician George
Spencer-Brown admitted that he could not fault the typical methodological rigour and validity of parapsychological experimentation and -convinced psi phenomena were absolutely impossiblefound the accumulating data so robust that instead of employing popular standard responses such as fraud or methodological incompetence concluded that Rhine and colleagues had provided "the most prominent empirical reason for beginning to doubt the universal applicability of classical frequency probability" (Spencer-Brown, 1957, p. 247) . Among philosophers of science, Michael Scriven has expressed similarly reaffirming opinions regarding the robustness of parapsychological effects.
Juxtaposing psychoanalysis and parapsychology, he believed that "psychoanalysis provides us with a great theory without a factual foundation; parapsychology, a factual basis on which there is yet to be built a great theory" (Scriven, 1964, p. 104 ).
14 When Francis Bacon proposed experiments to test fascinatio (an early modern equivalent of psi) he noted: "It is true, that that may hold in these things which is the general Root of Superstition; namely, that men observe when things hit, and not when they miss, and commit to Memory the one, and forget and pass over the other" (Bacon, 1670, p. 212) . But he also cautioned that "Men are to admonished, that they do not withdraw credit from the Operations by Transmission of Spirits and Force of Imagination, because the effects fail sometimes" (ibid., p. 198). Long before 12 The often fickle behaviour and capriciousness of instruments in the physical sciences is rarely addressed in popular chronologies of scientific progress, which critics of unorthodox sciences are so fond of promulgating. For example, when Robert Boyle launched his experimental programme, it galled him that contemporaries were often unable to replicate his experiments with the air pump (Shapin & Schaffer, 1985, chapter 6) , and works such as Harry Collins's seminal study of the sociology of replication in mainstream science as well as in parapsychology (Collins, 1992) still have done little to help inform popular as well as scholarly accounts of replication of controversial phenomena. 13 See, however, Utts (1991) . 14 Similarly, Paul Churchland believes that to "a philosopher or historian of science, parapsychology appears as a strikingly atheoretical discipline" (Churchland, 1998, p. 312, original italics) . While Scriven at least demonstrates intimate familiarity with the work of the relatively atheoretical Rhine and colleagues, Churchland seems completely unaware of both the historical and contemporary wealth of theory-driven parapsychological research. We remember that Frederic Myers's theoretical framework of the 'subliminal self', for example, was partially adopted by James, Flournoy, Jung and other eminent psychologists. After it became eclipsed by psychoanalysis, Jungian analytical psychology and other depth psychologies, there has never been a lack of more traditionally 'naturalistic' theories. For a thorough reevaluation of Myers's theoretical framework, see Kelly et al. (2007) . Overviews of theories in experimental parapsychology are Rao (1978) and Stokes (1987) . More recent theoretical proposals are, e.g., Atmanspacher, Römer, & Walach (2002) and Carpenter (2012) .
psychologists began studying the role of experimenter effects as a methodological problem in conventional as well as unorthodox science, psychical researchers like Edmund Gurney argued:
The man who first hears of thought-transference very naturally imagines that, if it is a reality, it ought to be demonstrated to him at a moment's notice. (Feyerabend, 1991, p. 183) . 16 While this is not the place to discuss and weigh the concrete historical evidence for fraud in psychical research, there is a telling asymmetry in standard claims of fraud as one of the discipline's defining features. But as philosopher Curt Ducasse cautioned, "allegations of detection of fraud […] have to be scrutinized as closely and as critically as must the testimony for the reality of the phenomena. For there is likely to be just as much wishful thinking, prejudice, emotion, snap judgement, naivité, and intellectual dishonesty on the side of orthodoxy […] as on the side of hunger for and of belief in the marvellous" (Ducasse, 1958, p. 22) . Likewise, William James observed "The 'scientist,' who is confident of 'fraud' here, must remember that in science as much as in common life an hypothesis must receive some positive specification and determination before it can be profitably discussed; and a fraud which is no assigned kind of fraud, but simply 'fraud' at large, fraud in abstracto, can hardly be regarded as a specially scientific explanation of specific concrete facts" (James, 1898, p. 421), an argument later developed by Pinch (1979) . Yet it is customary in the popular science as well as professional philosophy literature on demarcation to equate claims of fraud in marginalized disciplines with evidence for fraud, usually tacitly implying that mainstream science was completely unimpinged by data manipulation. Philosophical advocates of psychical research like Stephen Braude (1997) have therefore opposed to the standard procedure of reducing the history of parapsychological research to undisputed instances of detected fraud without attempting to proportion those with the strongest cases and data.
humdrum psychology experiments will usually be affected if investigators don't even try to conceal their hostility towards them.
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Another historical consideration complicates sweeping assurances that 'science' has been unable to confirm alleged parapsychological effects. In order for an effect claimed by one investigator to be confirmed by another, naturally the other must be willing to test in the first place. (2007), Taylor (1996) and Sommer (2012b Sommer ( , 2013a . For Albert Moll's combat against 'superstition' see Sommer (2012a) and Wolffram (2006) . Unsavoury encounters with the 'Amazing Randi', whose lucrative bullying of deviant scientists and their subjects has earned him awards by the American Physical Society and the MacArthur Foundation, have been documented not only by his targets but also by sociologists like Harry Collins and Trevor Pinch (cf. Collins, 1983; Collins & Pinch, 1982) . Regarding the support of Randi by prominent scientists, Harry Collins and Robert Evans protested that "it is hard to remain neutral in the face of the process; we find ourselves wanting to be prescriptive and say that this is 'wrong' -it is a dereliction of scientific duty. After all, among other things, scientists are there to help us know whether there are paranormal effects or homeopathic effects, but their input should be based on their best scientific efforts; ex-cathedra statements, or dirty tricks, are of no special value, nor should scientists pass their responsibility to outside groups" (Collins & Evans, 2002, p. 265) . 18 On the Kulturkampf ('Struggle for culture') and its political and historiographical implications, see, e.g. Blackbourn Skrupskelis & Berkeley (1992 -2004 . Further historical instances of 'aloofness coupled with authoritativeness' in the response to psychical research by professional scientists were documented by Prince (1930) . 20 The scholarly primary literature of parapsychology and psychical research mentioned above is usually ignored and substituted by references to popular magazines like the Skeptical Inquirer (the 'Magazine for Science and Reason'), published by the international flagship of the 'Skeptics' movement, the 'Committee of Skeptical Investigation' (CSI, previously the 'Committee for the Scientific Investigation of Claims of the Paranormal'), monographs typically produced by Prometheus Press (a publishing house owned by a founder of the modern Skeptics movement, the recently deceased militant secular humanist philosopher Paul Kurtz (Berkley, 1987) , and, not least, writings by problematic historical debunkers like Jastrow, Hall and Münsterberg. The usually deeply biased entries on parapsychological topics on Wikipedia are also dominated by the literature produced by modern Enlightenment crusaders organised in Skeptics clubs and associations.
sources of historical research.
Conclusion: What does it mean to be rational?
From about the late 1970s, discussions of demarcation have started shifting from philosophy to sociology and history of science, and sociological studies of public and political responses to parapsychological research suggest that very little has changed in its popular and academic reception. 21 Whilst critics continue to launch uninformed but widely publicised attacks, editors of mainstream journals have admitted to stick to the rule of rejecting papers reporting positive psi effects irrespective of the quality of submitted manuscripts. And whereas it is still almost impossible for scientists to get negative replication studies in comparatively uncontroversial areas published, reports of unsuccessful psi experiments have become convenient ways of promoting one's career particularly in psychology, where manuscripts confirming the parapsychological null hypothesis continue to help bolster psychology's 'scientific' image. All the while, a flood of studies in the psychology of paranormal belief and 'anomalistic psychology' disregard relevant empirical data from psychical research, feature Joseph Jastrow, James Randi and other hard-liners as patron saints, and subtly perpetuate the enlightened pathologization of deviant epistemologies by explaining them through a whole battery of generalized biases and cognitive or emotional deficiencies.
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As voices from the precognition survey by the writer Joseph Priestley in 1960s Britain (studied in Katy Price's contribution to this special issue) appear to confirm, the normalization of the exceptional has come at the heavy prize of social stigmatisation. Regardless of social and intellectual status, most of us simply do not want to be associated with fields of research whose subject matter public opinion has equated with quackery, folly, theological corruption, intellectual vulgarity and mental illness. Having grown up learning that the belief in the very possibility of the occurrence of certain hypothetical phenomena anachronistically labelled as 'supernatural' 23 constitutes the absolute opposite of a 'scientific' and 'rational' attitude, we are hardly ever 21 For sociological and historical studies of demarcation, see, for example, Mauskopf (1979) , Wallis (1979 ), Gieryn (1983 , Rupnow, Lipphardt, Thiel, & Wesseley (2008) . Sociological investigations of parapsychology are, e.g., Collins & Pinch (1979 , 1982 , Hess (1992 , 1993 ), McClenon (1984 . 22 See the standard textbook of 'anomalistic psychology' (Zusne & Jones, 1989) and activities by members of the Anomalistic Psychology Research Unit at Goldsmiths University, London, who also publish a popular 'Skeptic' magazine. More differentiating and scrupulously informed works on clinical and empirical aspects of exceptional human experiences like Cardeña, Lynn, & Krippner (2000) still form the exception in discussions of the psychology of 'paranormal belief'. 23 While Richard Noakes has shown that elite Victorian physical scientists investigating spiritualism and related problems fundamentally challenged traditional naturalism-supernaturalism dichotomies (e.g. Noakes, 2004a Noakes, , 2004b Noakes, , 2008 , I made a similar case in my reconstruction of debates around psychical research in the human sciences, notably during the formation of modern professionalized psychology (Sommer, 2013a). encouraged to investigate the historicity of modern standard attitudes dismissive of the subject matter of psychical research. It can therefore be safely assumed that these cultural and social constraints have coerced many to keep their unorthodox convictions to themselves. A possible case in question might be Karl Popper, who wrote to Ivor Grattan-Guinness in 1984 regarding parapsychological phenomena: "I feel confident that such things exist, but the attempt to make them 'scientific' seems to me not only unsuccessful so far, but to lead to a travesty" (Grattan-Guinness, 1998, p. 470). Many readers might be surprised to hear that Popper was convinced that psychic phenomena occur, and Popper's request to the recipient of his letter of treating this admission confidentially (Grattan-Guinness thought it justified to disregard the request after Popper's death) might be interpreted in the above sense. (such as humility in the face of evidence contradicting prior beliefs, and courage in defending new discoveries even at personal risk) is necessary for the scientific enterprise to maintain its popular appeal as an intrinsically progressive endeavour. 24 As a note to the history of falsificationism, it is curious that both William James and Popper used anomalous colouration in birds to illustrate refuting instances. James announced that for him a decade of first-hand tests of the trance phenomena of Leonora Piper had falsified the great induction of psychology, nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu: "If you will let me use the language of the professional logic shop, a universal proposition can be made untrue by a particular instance. If you wish to upset the law that all crows are black, you mustn't seek to show that no crows are; it is enough if you prove one single crow to be white. My own white crow is Mrs. Piper" (James, 1896, p. 884). Popper's subsequent choice of a black swan as a falsifying instance is peculiar enough, though it is probably idle to speculate whether he was familiar with James's statement. 25 I reserve a comprehensive discussion of fundamental methodological difficulties raised by historians' safe but stagnant reliance on problematic secondary sources on the 'occult' for a separate occasion.
Lastly, it might be evident that historians addressing certain asymmetries firmly ingrained in western academic culture and thinking styles face the risk of becoming intellectual outlaws themselves. To attempt facilitating balanced and informed discussion of forever disputed areas of human experience like those that have formed the subject matter of psychical research requires cutting through a rather thorny thicket of unhelpful myths of scientific epistemologies and practice, whose deep roots have vanished from public awareness. Hence, even though it should be clear that as historians it can hardly be our job to resolve age-old scientific controversies let alone make claims regarding the existence or non-existence of psychic phenomena, just by pointing out glaring asymmetries in the standard discourse about psychical research there is a genuine danger of attracting the ire of certain influential groups and figures who have been quick to level charges of 'relativism' and even 'anti-science'. Aware that the topics treated in this special issue thoroughly go against the grain of many ideologies and epistemological standard positions, its contributors strove to employ those core principles that most will agree make good science as well as good history:
contextualised evidence and differentiated analysis.
